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October 27, 2005

Utah Court of Appeals
Attn: Lisa Collins, Clerk
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Ivers et al v. UDOT
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 2005024 6-CA

Dear Ms. Collins:
We represent appellants in the above-referenced matter that was argued before the court of
appeals on Wednesday, October 26, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 24(i), UTAH R. APP. P., appellants
hereby supplement their briefs with the following legal authorities bearing upon issues involved
in this appeal.
•

Point 1 of appellants' opening brief (at p. 7), quotes the just compensation clause under
Utah's Constitution. The following cases hold that Utah's Constitution is broader than
the similar provision under the federal constitution:

Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995) (Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution is broader in its language than the similar provision in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) ("[A]rticle
I, Section 22 protects all property protected by its federal counterpart, and perhaps even more so
due to its more expansive language.") (citation omitted).
•

The appellate court should disregard arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See,
e.g., Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. OfEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). The State of
Utah made an argument regarding the definition of limited access highway for the first
time at oral argument on October 26, 2005.

•

UTAH CODE ANN.

§72-6-117(5) provides:

A highway authority may acquire, by gift, devise, purchase, or
condemnation, private or public property and property rights for a
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limited-access facility and service road, including rights of access,
air, view, and light. . . . (Emphasis added).
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.
Very truly your^

JQHN W.HOLT
cc:\Stephen C. Ward
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INTRODUCTION
Appellee (referred to herein as "UDOT") condemned a portion of appellants'
(referred to herein collectively as "Arby's") commercial property. That property was then
contributed to UDOT's adjacent construction project, severely diminishing the value of
Arby's remaining property. Arby's is entitled, under constitutional principles and the
express provisions of Utah's condemnation statutes, to put on evidence at trial of
severance damages resulting from UDOT's condemnation.
Arby's submits State of Utah v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002)
does not mandate the exclusion of severance damages in this case. The distinctions
between the present matter and Harvey Real Estate should be carefully analyzed, rather
than given short shrift. Based upon the analysis of the particular facts and circumstances
in this matter, this court should reverse the lower court's ruling and permit the finder of
fact to consider evidence on the issue of lost accessibility.
Additionally, with respect to the issue of Arby's loss of view and visibility, UDOT
has failed to adequately explain how the holdings of Harvey Real Estate or Utah State
Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 962 (Utah 1974) preclude Arby's claims for severance
damages resulting from UDOT's taking of the appurtenant rights of light and air.
Specifically, Harvey Real Estate serves as no precedential value on the issue of loss of
view and visibility and does not defeat Arby's claims under the Miya decision. Arby's
should be permitted to present the issue of loss of view and visibility to the trier of fact.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
UDOT's brief does not dispute or oppose any of the factual statements set forth in
Arby's opening brief.
Arby's responds to the following numbered paragraphs of the statement of facts
contained in UDOT's brief as follows:

[

1.

Arby's is located on the northwest corner
of what was the intersection of Shepard
Lane and US 89 in Farmington, Utah.

Not in dispute.

2.

The size of the Arby's commercial site is
approximately 0.416 acres.

Not in dispute.

3.

UDOT condemned a 0.048 acre portion
of Arby's property in fee.

Not in dispute.

4.

The 0.048 acres of Arby's condemned
property was used to construct a one-way
frontage road immediately parallel to the
newly elevated and widened US 89.
None of the land taken from Arby's was
used to widen US 89.

Arby's does not dispute its property
was taken to construct a one-way 1
frontage road as part of UDOT's
project.
However, Arby's does
dispute that its property was not
taken for purposes of widening US
89.
In fact, the Condemnation
Resolution specifically states the |
purpose of the taking was for the
widening of US 89. Condemnation
Resolution, R. at p. 6.

5.

The Shepard Lane/US 89 intersection
has been eliminated and US 89 has been
elevated creating an underpass allowing
traffic to travel east-west on Shepard
Lane underneath the elevated highway.

Not in dispute.
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6.

As a result of the project, access to
Arby's from US 89 can now be had from
access points approximately one-half
mile to the north and one-half mile to the
south of Arby's to the new frontage
roads constructed for the project.

Arby's admits its property can be
accessed. However, there has been
no evidence presented or considered
by a trier of fact concerning how
access has been impacted. UDOT
makes conclusory statements that
access to the property remains
reasonable and the value of the
property has not been diminished.
Prior to the condemnation of Arby's
property and the construction of
UDOT's massive project, Arby's
restaurant was purposely positioned
on the corner of a busy intersection.
The easy access and visibility are
what gave Arby's property its value
as commercial property.

7.

Access to Arby's from Shepard Lane
remains unchanged.

Arby's admits there is access to its
property from Shepard Lane. Arby's
also incorporates herein by this
reference its response to the
foregoing paragraph 6.

8.

The purpose of eliminating the Shepard
Lane/US 89 intersection and thus
elevating and widening US 89 was to
decrease the number of accidents in the
area due to the nature of the intersection.

The
Condemnation
Resolution
specifically provides Arby's property
was taken to widen the expressway.
However, even if the subject
intersection was eliminated for
safety reasons, this does not excuse |
UDOT from paying severance
damages to Arby's.

9.

It should be noted that there are two
other cases where properties adjacent to
Arby's and across US 89 from Arby's
have been denied the same relief in their
respective trial courts that Arby's is
seeking in this case. Moreover, there is
an appellate court case where the rulings
in Harvey were upheld last year.

Arby's objects to this fact statement
and its relevance. One of the other
pending cases cited by Arby's
pertains to the Goodyear Tire
property located immediately north j
of the Arby's property.
See
U
Addendum B" to UDOT's brief.
The Goodyear case has essentially
been treated as a companion case to
the present matter because it is
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adjacent to the Arby's property; the
issues are substantially similar; and
the two cases involve the same
counsel and the same judge. In fact,
the Goodyear case has essentially
been put on hold pending the
outcome of the present appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
UDOT FAILS TO APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRESENT
MATTER AND HARVEY REAL ESTATE
Although Arby's has pointed out numerous distinguishing features of the present
case as compared to Harvey Real Estate, UDOT focuses upon the commercial vs. noncommercial distinction. UDOT claims this distinction has no bearing on the analysis of
whether Arby's can pursue severance damages. UDOT has utterly ignored the case
Arby's has cited from another jurisdiction holding that the commercial characteristic of
property is a legitimate factor in the severance damages analysis. See People v. Becker,
69 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (4th Dist. 1968) ("The fact that property abutting on a street is
zoned for business purposes and is located in a busy commercial area enters into a
determination whether impairment of the right of access is substantial."). UDOT has
failed to present any authority that is contrary to this position. The commercial nature and
location of Arby's property and all of the other distinguishing features of this case set
forth in an Arby's opening brief should be carefully considered before foreclosing Arby's
right to pursue a remedy for the loss of substantial property rights.

4

UDOT even attempts to raise equal protection arguments with respect to
considering the commercial vs. non-commercial property distinction in this case. The
case UDOT cites for this proposition, Grutter v. Bollenger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) isn't
even a condemnation case. That case involved race-conscious admission policies of the
University of Michigan Law School. At any rate, Arby's and the property owners in
Harvey Real Estate are clearly not similarly situated. See Brief of Appellants at pp. 1011. Therefore, there is no basis for UDOT's equal protection argument. It is well settled
each case should be decided on its own set of facts. See Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department
of Employment Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 19 (UT App. 1993). See also Leininger v. SteamsRoger Mfg. Co., 404 P.2d 33, 41 (Utah 1965) ("each case must be decided on the basis of
its own facts and seldom are two cases identical."). Harvey Real Estate should not be
applied blindly to the present matter.
POINT 2.
UDOT'S CAUSATION ARGUMENT
IS TOO NARROW
Pursuant to its interpretation of the Harvey Real Estate decision, upon which it
almost exclusively relies, UDOT concludes Arby's can recover no severance damages for
loss of reasonable access because the damage suffered by Arby's is unrelated to the
taking.

Based upon Harvey Real Estate, UDOT argues the US 89/Shepard Lane

intersection closure was not caused by the condemnation of Arby's property. To take
such a causation argument to its logical extreme would severely infringe upon the clear
constitutional and statutory rights of property owners. Claims for severance damages

5

would be improperly restricted by semantics rather than reality, and one more step would
be taken in the direction of rendering UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2)* meaningless.
Therefore, UDOT is either misapplying Harvey Real Estate or, alternatively, the Harvey
Real Estate decision needs further consideration with respect to how far it goes in
interpreting and applying the condemnation statutes to limit a property owner's ability to
pursue claims of severance damages.
The Utah Supreme Court in Harvey Real Estate describes a concern that if the
property owner in that case had been allowed to recover severance damages, it would
open up claims for property owners along a multi-mile-length of road construction
project, seeking damages for construction being done miles away. See 57 P.3d at 1090.
Based upon the distinct and unique facts of the present matter, Arby's could be allowed to
pursue its severance damages claims without opening up the Pandora's box that was of
concern to the supreme court in deciding Harvey Real Estate. The portion of UDOT's
project that impacts Arby's property is immediately adjacent to Arby's property. Arby's
is not seeking relief for conditions that are miles away from its property.
In sum, UDOT's causation argument makes no sense if the condemnation statute is
to provide any protection at all to property owners. UDOT admits Arby's property was

The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by plaintiff. . .. (Emphasis added).
6

taken "for the widening of an expressway State Route 89. . . ." Condemnation Resolution,
R. at p. 6. The widening project involved closing the intersection at which Arby's
commercial property is located. UDOT's project could not have been accomplished had
Arby's property not been taken and incorporated into UDOT's project.

In essence,

Arby's was required to give up property for incorporation into a construction project that
has destroyed the value of Arby's commercial property. This is precisely the type of case
where the Constitution and Utah's severance damages statute should protect the property
owner when forced to make a sacrifice for the public good. There clearly is a sufficient
causal relationship between the taking and the severance damages Arby's has suffered.
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2), the matter should be presented to the trier
of fact for determination.
POINT 3.
REASONABLENESS OF ACCESS
IS A QUESTION OF FACT
Although UDOT is confident the language of Harvey Real Estate concerning
causation ends the inquiry about severance damages, UDOT takes up nearly four pages of

The value of Arby's commercial property had much to do with its location,
which made it highly visible and allowed for easy access by customers. That access has
now been severely curtailed.
UDOT improperly relies upon the case of Intermountain Sports, Inc. v.
Department ofTransp. 103 P.3d 716 (Ut. App. 2004). Intermountain Sports is obviously
distinguishable from the present matter because it did not involve the taking of any
property. It was an inverse condemnation case. The case of Utah Dep 't. of Transp. v.
D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987), which is also cited by UDOT, is similarly
distinguishable.
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its brief inappropriately arguing the current access to Arby's property is reasonable.
UDOT's argument is nothing more than pure speculation. No trier of fact has made such
a determination based upon the evidence. Arby's has been prevented from putting on any
such evidence. That is the core issue of this appeal.
As an alternative to its claim that access to Arby's property is reasonable, UDOT
argues other factors, such as the closure of a nearby K-Mart, are the cause of Arby's
damages. UDOT also argues recently placed blue exit signs with Arby's logo attached
have remedied any problem caused by Arby's loss of visibility.

The court should

disregard such speculative arguments because they have not been considered prior to this
appeal.
POINT 4.
ARBY'S IS ENTITLED TO PURSUE DAMAGES
FOR LOSS OF VIEW AND VISIBILITY
While UDOT relies heavily on Harvey Real Estate, that case is distinguishable
from the present matter because it did not involve the loss of an abutting property owner's
appurtenant rights of light, air and view. In other words, Harvey Real Estate has no direct
precedential value with respect to the present case. On the other hand, the facts in Utah

During the motion phase at the trial court, Arby's submitted a study it
commissioned to show the reduced access. See Traffic Study, R. at 116-118. UDOT
never objected to Arby's submission of the report, which is now part of the record. See
State of Utah v. Law, 75 P.3d 923, 924 (UT App. 2003) ("an appellate court's review is
limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal."). However, UDOT now asks
the appellate court to disregard that report in its consideration of this appeal. UDOT's
objection should be deemed waived inasmuch as it has waited until now to complain
about the traffic study. See State of Utah v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 507 (UT App. 1999)
(generally, appellate courts will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal).
8

State Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are much more similar to the
facts in the present matter.

The Utah Supreme Court in Miya affirmed the property

owner's award of severance damages resulting from the construction of an elevated
viaduct built within a roadway abutting the property owner's property.
The Miya case clearly provides that an abutting property owner has the appurtenant
rights of light and air. 526 P.2d at 929 ("An owner of land abutting on a street is also in
possession of an easement of view, which constitutes a property right which may not be
taken without just compensation."). The Miya court held "the rights of access, light and
air are easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute
property rights forming part of the owner's estate." Id. at 928 (emphasis added). In fact,
UDOT admits the existence of these appurtenant rights. See UDOT's brief at p. 15. The
court in Miya went on to hold these appurtenant property rights are "substantial" and
cannot be taken without just compensation. Id. at 928 and 929.
In the present matter, Arby's remaining property abuts UDOT's new roadway
system, which contains the newly elevated US 89. In fact, Arby's is immediately west of
the pinnacle of the US 89 overpass.

Arby's view to the east is totally blocked.

Additionally, the property's ability to be seen has been obstructed by UDOT's project.
Obviously, Arby's, as an abutting property owner to the roadway, has had its appurtenant
rights infringed upon by UDOT.

Like the present case, the construction project in Miya involved an elevated
roadway and a system of one-way frontage roads. Miya, 526 P.2d at 928.
9

Miya does not hold the precise component of an abutting construction project that
interferes with view and visibility be constructed on the property taken from the
complaining property owner.

Miya only requires the property abut the roadway, which

the Arby's property does in this case. The supreme court specifically stated in Miya:
"one of the rights appurtenant to abutting property is that of receiving light and air from
the highway, and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation for infringement of his
right to light and air by a structure in the highway, even if it is a proper highway use." Id.
at 929 (emphasis added).
UDOT argues Harvey Real Estate modifies Miya. However, a careful review of
both cases indicates Harvey Real Estate, which did not include facts similar to those
presented in the present matter, only explains that if a property owner claims special and
peculiar injury, as opposed to infringement of appurtenant property rights, the special or
peculiar injury must be related to the taking. 57 P.3d at 1092. Because the present case
involves UDOT's infringement of Arby's appurtenant property rights, the special and
peculiar injury analysis need not be addressed.

6

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2) does not expressly state that the construction of
the improvement must be located on the property that has been taken in order for a
property owner to seek severance damages.
7

Harvey Real Estate points out that u[a]s a practical matter, where a taking has
occurred, an owner would not need to rely on the 'special and peculiar injury' he has
suffered because he could recover directly for the taking itself." Harvey Real Estate, 57
P.2d at 1092. The present matter does involve a taking; therefore, Arby's need not rely
upon the special and peculiar injury element as a basis for its severance damages claim.
10

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments set forth in Arby's opening brief, this
court should reverse the trial court's ruling and permit Arby's to put on evidence of
severance damages at trial.
Respectfully submitted this 10 day of July, 2005.
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